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Abstract
We analyse the impact of a social security reform that changed the costs incurred by firms due to
sickness absences. The reform abolished a compulsory insurance for firms, which insured them
against the wages paid to sick blue-collar workers. During the first year after its introduction, we
estimate that the reform resulted in about 6.3 percent fewer sickness absences, and in about 8.6
percent fewer absence days. We do not find evidence for changes in hiring or firing, and we find
only limited workforce composition changes. We do not find spillover effects on the absences of
white-collar workers. Robustness checks confirm these results.
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I. Introduction
Sickness absences lead to significant productivity losses, and consequently
reduce incomes and profits (Allen, 1983; Coles and Treble, 1993; Brown
and Sessions, 1996; Barham and Begum, 2005; Osterkamp and Ro¨hn,
2007). Firms in most OECD countries are at least partially insured against
the direct costs arising from their workers’ sickness absences. In some
countries, the amount or period of statutory sick pay is limited. For example,
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2 Costs of sickness absences
Norwegian firms need to pay workers their full wages during the first 16
days of a sickness absence, and social security pays the wages thereafter
(Markussen et al., 2012). In other countries, firms are refunded for the
costs incurred when their workers are sick. For example, in Germany, firms
that have fewer than 30 employees have part of their costs refunded by
an insurance fund (Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010). Depending on how such
insurance is organized, firms might have an incentive to exert very little
effort in monitoring or in preventing absences, which in turn might lead to
more sickness absences.
Economic research has devoted considerable effort to determine if sick
pay leads employees to “adapt their work-absence behavior” (Johansson and
Palme, 2005, p. 1880), and to remain absent from work without actually
being sick.1 The growing body of literature on absenteeism has identified
several other determinants of sickness absence.2
However, there is little evidence on how changes in the costs incurred
by firms affect sickness absences. Westergaard-Nielsen and Pertold (2012)
find that a voluntary insurance scheme for small companies in Denmark
led to more short-term sickness absences, possibly from lower levels of
monitoring. Fevang et al. (2014) analyse a Norwegian reform that exempted
employers from refunding sick pay only for pregnancy-related absences.
They show that this exemption led to approximately 5 percent more sickness
absence spells of pregnant women.
We exploit a reform of the social security system in Austria to provide
causal evidence for the effect of employers’ incurred costs on their workers’
absences. The reform provides a unique situation that allows us to study
whether employees’ absences changed after an exogenous variation in
firms’ costs. The mandatory insurance insured firms against the direct
costs incurred because of their blue-collar workers’ sickness absences until
1There is substantial evidence that both the availability and the level of sickness benefits
influence the extent of absenteeism. Johansson (1996), Johansson and Palme (2005), andHall and
Hartman (2010) find such a moral hazard for Swedish workers. Similarly, Ziebarth and Karlsson
(2010) and Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) show that a reduction in the replacement rate for sick
workers in Germany substantially decreased sickness absences and hospitalization days. In the
United States, where workers are not universally covered by sickness insurance, numerous studies
investigate the moral hazard associated with worker compensation schemes. Krueger (1990) and
Hirsch et al. (1997), among others, find that these insurance schemes have large incentive effects
onworkers’behaviour, althoughmore recently, Bronchetti andMcInerney (2012) have challenged
the prevailing wisdom that workers are highly responsive to changes in benefit levels.
2These include: workers’ health status (Delgado and Kniesner, 1997) and gender differences
(Ichino and Moretti, 2009); social norms, peer-group dynamics, and infection effects on the
workplace (Drago and Wooden, 1992; Ichino and Maggi, 2000; Barmby and Larguem, 2009);
working conditions, work arrangements, and work contracts (Darr and Johns, 2008; Riphahn,
2004; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Dionne and Dostie, 2008); business cycle effects on labour
force composition (Askildsen et al., 2005); and doctors’ behaviour (Markussen et al., 2011).
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September 2000. The insurance was abolished in 2000 and firms no longer
receive a refund. This reform changed the firms’ costs for sickness absences,
but it did not affect workers’ entitlements to continued wage payments when
sick.
Our findings are helpful for designing sickness insurance systems
worldwide, because as many as 145 countries provide paid sickness
absences (Scheil-Adlung and Sandner, 2010). The institutional arrangements
that govern the roles of firms and public entities (e.g., social
insurance agencies) in providing insurance are heterogeneous and rarely
studied. Our results are particularly relevant for analysing institutional
settings similar to the one that we observe in Austria until 2000.
Examples of (at least partial) reimbursements of firms’ wage payments
during sickness absences can be observed in Germany, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, and South Africa. Moreover, concerns about firms’
behaviour towards sickness absences might also exist in countries
such as Switzerland, where private insurance companies offer to insure
employers against the wage payments they incur when their workers are
sick.
We use register data from the Austrian Social Security database (ASSD)
on 33,892 firms for the period from January 1998 to September 2002.
We combine these data with data from the statutory health insurance,
which provide information on workers’ days of paid sickness absences. We
distinguish between the extensive margin of sickness absences, the number
of sickness absences per worker in a firm, and the intensive margin, the
number of sickness absence days per worker. We calculate for each firm the
ratio of refunds for wages paid to insurance premiums to obtain a variable
for the intensity of the treatment. We estimate the effect of the reform
by comparing firms that were not treated (i.e., those that employed only
white-collar or blue-collar workers who were never on sickness absence)
with treated firms (i.e., those that received refunds in the pre-reform period).
According to our estimates, the removal of insurance significantly reduced
sickness absences. We estimate that the reform lowered both the number
of sickness spells (extensive margin) and the number of sickness days
(intensive margin). Thus, we estimate that in the first year after the reform
was introduced, it resulted in about 6.3 percent fewer sickness absences and
about 8.6 percent fewer absence days.
The available data do not allow us to examine the behavioural changes
of firms and employees in detail; however, we show that the reform
did not change the hiring and firing practices of firms in the short
term. In addition, changes in workforce composition were limited. This
suggests that other factors (e.g., stricter monitoring or adapted worker
behaviour) were the major forces behind the observed reduction in sickness
absences.
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II. Institutional Settings
In Austria, a sick worker needs to see a medical doctor who certifies the
sickness and informs the social security administration. The worker has to
inform the employer about the expected period of the sickness absence. A
worker who is still sick at the end of the period needs to see a doctor again
to obtain an extension. Similarly, if a worker wishes to return to work before
the end of the initially expected period, he or she will need to see a doctor
to obtain a revised certificate. Employers who allow workers to return to
work without the doctor’s approval risk a fine and might lose insurance
coverage, for instance, if the worker is involved in a work accident.
Employers have to pay sick workers their full wages. The length of
continued wage payment depends on worker tenure, and ranges from six
weeks for tenures shorter than five years to a maximum of 12 weeks for
tenures longer than 25 years. After this period, social security pays half of
the wages for another four weeks, while the other half has to be paid by
the firm. After these four weeks, a firm’s obligation to continued payments
ends.3 According to labour law, a sickness absence does not provide any
additional protection from dismissal than those regulated by the law. An
employee who is dismissed during a sickness absence does, however, retain
the right to receive continued wage payments for the full period prescribed
by the law.
Sickness absences cause substantial direct costs to firms. A reform
of the Austrian social insurance system provides a natural experiment
to investigate the effect of changes in sickness costs on firms’ sickness
absences. Until September 2000, a mandatory insurance refunded firms for
wages paid to sick blue-collar workers. This insurance was abolished in
September 2000 and no refunds were made after December 2000.4
The insurance was financed by firms’ contributions and it was managed
by the Austrian social security administration. There was no experience
rating and firms had to pay 2.1 percent of their blue-collar workers’ wages
as contribution.5 The refund differed between small and large firms. Small
firms received 100 percent and large firms received 70 percent of the wages
3The worker might receive sick pay from the social security for up to one year if still unfit for
work.
4Between October and December 2000, only sickness absences that had started before October
were refunded. In September 2002, a minor reform was introduced. For absences longer than 10
days, small firms receive a 50 percent refund for the wages paid to sick workers after the 10th
day of the sickness absence.
5Private-sector workers inAustria are employed either as blue- or white-collar workers depending
on the types of tasks they perform.According toAustrian law, white-collar workers are employees
who perform commercial tasks (kaufma¨nnische Dienste), non-commercial higher tasks (ho¨here,
nicht kaufma¨nnischeDienste), or clerical work (Bu¨rota¨tigkeiten). Conversely, blue-collar workers
are entrusted mainly with manual tasks. Several legal reforms diminished the relevance of this
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paid to sick blue-collar workers. A firm was considered large if its total
monthly wage bill of month t − 2 was above a certain threshold, 180 times
the maximum daily social security contribution, for all sickness absences
that started in month t.6
Although the insurance refunded firms only for blue-collar workers’
absences, the definition of firm size was based on the wages of both blue-
and white-collar workers. The regulation intentionally favoured smaller
firms because they were assumed to have more problems covering sickness
absences than larger firms. In particular, small firms might need to hire
replacement workers if any of their workers are sick. Large firms, by
contrast, can often cover for sick workers by reallocating tasks within the
firm.7
From a worker’s perspective, the regulation of sickness absences
changed very little during the period. At the same time as the abolition of
the insurance scheme, the maximum period for continued wage payments
of blue-collar workers was extended to that of white-collar workers. Until
2000, the entitlement for blue-collar workers was, for every tenure category,
two weeks shorter than that of white-collar workers.
III. Hypotheses
The abolition of the insurance changed firms’ incentives. Firms can
influence the level of sickness absences of their employees primarily by
investing in health promotion (Aldana and Pronk, 2001) or by enforcing
stricter monitoring (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004). When firms are (partly)
insured against the absences of their blue-collar workers, the insurance
might lead to inefficient levels of monitoring and prevention. A refund
reduces the potential gains from monitoring and prevention, and could
lead firms to refrain from monitoring their workers if the expected gains
from monitoring are less than the costs incurred. This also implies that a
sufficiently high refund will cause the firm to stop monitoring its absent
workers for shirking.
The abolition of the insurance increased the potential net gains from
prevention and monitoring activities, which is why we expect the reform
distinction. Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the differences in regulations
affecting blue- and white-collar workers, both before and after 2000.
6The social security contribution is regulated by law and changes each year. The threshold was
18,836.82 euros in 2000, which corresponded to approximately 10 full-time blue-collar workers
if they were paid the monthly median wage (1,822 euros).
7This assumption is supported by the economic literature on absenteeism. For instance, Barmby
and Stephan (2000) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence showing how firm size
is inversely related to the costs resulting from absences.
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to result in fewer sickness absences, if there was adjustment along the
extensive margin. We expect shorter sickness absences, if there was
adjustment along the intensive margin. Because workers have to pass a
medical examination by a medical doctor to be able to be absent from
work, we expect to see a stronger reaction in the durations rather than the
number of spells.
However, monitoring and prevention activities are not the only
transmission channels through which the reform might have affected
absences. Firms might have reacted to the reform with changes in their
hiring practices and in their selection of workers, perhaps even terminating
the contracts of sick workers. Also, behavioural changes of employees could
account for changes in the number or duration of absences. Given that, in
Austria, workers are not protected from dismissal during sickness absences,
it is possible that they reacted to the reform by avoiding sickness absences
altogether (i.e., with increased presenteeism).
The abolition of the insurance affected firms with different intensities.
Firms that employed only white-collar workers were not affected. The
treatment intensity of firms with blue-collar workers varied, depending on
the actual or potential changes in sickness absence costs resulting from the
reform. Firms that, on average, paid more premiums than they received in
refunds gained from the reform, and firms that received more refunds than
they paid in premiums lost from the reform. Therefore, we expect to see a
(larger) reduction in sickness absences in firms that received more refunds
than the premiums they paid. Treatment intensity might also depend on the
potential rather than the realized additional costs resulting from the reform
for the individual firm. Firms with a high share of blue-collar workers in
their workforce were affected more strongly by the reform than those with
a low share. Accordingly, we expect to see a (larger) reduction in sickness
absences in firms with a predominantly blue-collar workforce.
The reform increased blue-collar workers’ entitlement to sickness
absences to the duration of that of white-collar workers. The extension
of the maximum duration by two weeks might have increased blue-collar
workers’ incentives for prolonged sickness absences. If these changes result
in such behavioural responses, then our estimates cannot be interpreted as
the true causal effect of the reform. However, as the responses are likely
to increase rather than decrease sickness absences, the estimates could be
interpreted as a lower bound of the true causal effect.
IV. Data and Initial Results
We use register data from the ASSD for Upper Austria, one large state that
in 2000 accounted for approximately 17.5 percent of workers and 18 percent
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of firms (in NACE sectors C–E) in Austria (Statistik Austria, 2009).8 The
data provide information on all employees in dependent employment but
do not include the self-employed or civil servants. We observe all firms for
the period January 1998 to September 2002, and a unique firm identifier
permits the construction of firm-level information, such as firm size and
the number of sickness absences or their average duration, for each firm.
We augment these data with data from the statutory health insurance, which
provide information on sicknesses, particularly on the days of paid sickness
absences. The sample consists of about 1.65 million (firm × months)
observations on 33,892 firms.9
We distinguish between the extensive margin of sickness absences
(number of sickness absences per worker in firm i in month t) and
the intensive margin (number of days per worker on sickness absences).
Sicknesses are assigned to the month in which the spell began, and – in
case the spells extended to the following month – are not reset at the
beginning of the next month. We also calculate the number of absence
days divided by the number of spells to obtain a variable that informs us
about the average length of a sickness spell.
To analyse if the reform had an impact on sickness absences, we
construct a binary indicator, which is one if firm i received any refunds
in the pre-reform period, and zero if it did not. Table 1 tabulates the
means of the sickness variables for the two types of firms, for the pre-
and post-reform periods. The numbers indicate that sicknesses decreased in
firms that received refunds. On average, treated firms had about 7.8 percent
fewer sickness absences and about 8.8 percent fewer sickness days. Sickness
absences were, on average, about 11.1 percent shorter. In contrast, sickness
absences increased in firms that did not receive refunds: they had about
11.1 percent more sickness absences, 9.6 percent more sickness days, and
absences were, on average, about 8 percent longer. Taking these different
developments into account, tabulated in the DiD column of Table 1, this
suggests that treated firms had about 12 percent fewer sickness spells and
about 13 percent fewer sickness days, and that sickness spells were about
16 percent shorter in the post-reform period.
Labour legislation mandates that workers must provide a medical
certificate for all absences of more than three days. Employers can request
that their employees provide a certificate for sickness absences of shorter
durations; however, not all firms request a certificate from the first day of
8Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) provide a detailed description of these data. The ASSD contains
matched employer–employee data detailing the labour market history of private-sector workers
on a daily basis.
9Firms that do not have at least one employee in a month are dropped from the sample for that
particular month, but are included in the sample in other months if they employ workers.
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Table 1. Sickness absences, by treatment status
Before After Difference DiD
Treated firms
Spells 0.089 0.082 −0.007 −0.011
Days 0.933 0.850 −0.083 −0.122
Days per spell 0.623 0.554 −0.069 −0.098
Spells, bounded 0.074 0.067 −0.007 −0.010
Days, bounded 0.696 0.606 −0.090 −0.112
Observations 528,629 359,113
Control firms
Spells 0.036 0.040 0.004
Days 0.406 0.445 0.039
Days per spell 0.356 0.385 0.029
Spells, bounded 0.029 0.032 0.003
Days, bounded 0.271 0.293 0.022
Observations 442,464 322,291
Notes: 1,652,497 monthly observations of 33,892 firms. The treatment indicator is 1 if a firm received refunds in the
pre-reform period, whereas it is 0 if it did not receive any refunds. “Spells” refers to the number of sickness absences
per worker in a firm that started in a month. “Days” refers to the number of sickness days per worker in a firm of
all spells that started in the month. (Both variables are not reset at the beginning of the next month if an absence
lasts until the next month.) “Before” indicates the pre-reform period (i.e., January 1998 to September 2000) and
“After” indicates the post-reform period (i.e., October 2000 to September 2002). “Difference” indicates the difference
between the value in the After column and the Before column; “DiD” indicates the difference-in-differences (i.e., the
difference for treated firms − the difference for control firms). “Spell, bounded” and “Days, bounded” are based on
sickness absences of 4–28 days durations only.
absence. Consequently, short absences might not be fully documented by
the administrative data that are based on doctors’ notifications to the health
insurance. The abolition of the insurance in 2000 might have influenced
how firms handle absences of fewer than four days. Because firms do not
receive refunds after the reform, they have a lower incentive to require
workers to supply a doctor’s certificate for short sicknesses. In contrast, an
increase in monitoring after the abolition of the insurance might have led
firms to request medical certificates for short sickness spells as well. At the
same time, the reform extended the maximum duration of wage payments
by two weeks and affected spells of more than four weeks differently. (A
maximum of four weeks’ wage payments was the shortest entitlement; see
Table A1.) Therefore, we also use additional measures of sickness absences,
which are based on spells that were between 4 and 28 days long. However,
the differences are minor.
If both types of firms shared a common trend during the pre-reform
period, the difference-in-differences of Table 1 provides a causal estimate
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of the effect of the reform. This causal effect corresponds to θ in the
following equation,
sickit = α0 + θ(treatment indicator × period)it
+α1treatment indicatori + α2periodt + it, (1)
where periodt has a value of zero for the pre-reform period, January 1998
to September 2000, and a value of one for the post-reform period, October
2000 to September 2002.
To assess the common trend assumption more formally, we follow Autor
(2003) and use monthly indicators, mt , and their interactions with the
treatment indicator to estimate k leads and q lags of the reform:
sickit = β0 + β1treatment indicatori + mt
+
q∑
j=−k
βj(mt+j × treatment indicatori,t+j) + X ′itδ + it . (2)
We use the last pre-reform month, September 2000, as the omitted category.
The estimated βj for the pre-reform months indicate any (statistically
significant) differences between the treated and control observations that
existed before the reform, and therefore serve to assess the common trend
assumption. The vector Xit contains covariates, which control for firm
characteristics that have been reported as being related to firms’ sickness
absences. These are the fraction of women in the firm (Ichino and Moretti,
2009), the fraction of workers older than 55 years (Barmby et al., 2002),
and the log of the average wage in firm i in month t (Winkelmann, 1999).
We also control for the fraction of workers younger than 25 years, the
fraction of apprentices, the fraction of foreign workers, and the workers’
average age. We use indicator variables for the industry and indicators for
the quarter to account for seasonality in sicknesses.
The estimated βj and their 95 percent confidence intervals from fixed-
effects panel regressions are plotted in Figure 1. The top panel plots
the estimated treatment effects for spells and the bottom panel plots
the estimated treatment effects for days.10 The reference month for both
specifications is September 2000 (i.e., the last pre-reform month), indicated
by the vertical dashed line. Although some of the estimated pre-reform
coefficients are different from zero, no pattern is observed to suggest
different trends for treated and control firms. The estimates indicate that
firms reduced sickness absences at the onset of the reform and the estimated
treatment effects are consistently lower after the reform, indicating a
reduction in both sickness spells and sickness days.
10We also estimated ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions. The patterns are similar and the
coefficients are plotted in Figure W.1 in the Online Appendix.
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Fig. 1. Leads and lags, fixed-effects panel regressions
Notes: N = 1,652,497 firm×month observations. The diagram plots estimated treatment effects, β j , from estimating
equation (2). Each dot is an estimated treatment effect from fixed-effects panel regressions. The top panel plots the
estimated treatment effects for spells and the bottom panel plots the estimated treatment effects for days.The reference
month is September 2000 (i.e., the last pre-reform month), which is indicated by the vertical dashed line.
This result could also be caused by regressions towards the mean rather
than by causality. If sickness absences are random, firms that had high
absence levels in a period are then unlikely to experience high absence
levels in the next period. If this were the case, we would see that firms that
had low absence levels experienced an increase in their absences, and those
with a high absence level would have experienced a decline. To address this
concern, we calculate for each firm the refunds-to-premiums ratio in each
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Fig. 2. Sickness spells by intensity of treatment, before/after
Notes: The figure plots the mean sickness spells based on all absences (top) and on absences between 4 and 28 days
duration (bottom) by the percentiles of the refund share distribution, where we exclude firms with a treatment intensity
of 0. N = 17,465 firms.
pre-reform month. We average these monthly ratios over the pre-reform
period and interpret this “refund share” as a proxy for how much a firm
would have lost from the reform. A firm that did not employ blue-collar
workers, or whose blue-collar workers were never sick, has a value of zero.
About 48.5 percent of the firms (16,427) did not receive any refund in the
pre-reform period. The other 17,465 firms had an average of about 1.13,
suggesting that – conditional on receipt – refunds exceeded premiums. For
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Fig. 3. Leads and lags, by quartiles of treatment intensity: spells
Notes: The figure plots the estimated treatment effects, β j , for spells from estimating equation (2). Each dot is an
estimated treatment effect from a fixed-effects panel regression. The treatment indicator is 0, if the firm did not
receive refunds during the pre-reform period. The treatment indicator is 1 if the firms belongs to the qth-quartile
of the refund share distribution, excluding zeros. Each plot is based on a regression using the control group (N =
764,755 firm–month observations) and a quartile of the treatment intensity with values strictly greater than 0 (N =
221,962, 221,953, 221,905, and 221,922 firm–month observations). The reference month is September 2000 (i.e., the
last pre-reform month), which is indicated by the vertical dashed line.
each percentile of the strictly positive refund share distribution, we calculate
the average sickness spells and days for the pre- and post-reform periods.
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the mean sickness spells over the
percentiles of the treatment intensity for treated firms (i.e., those with a
treatment intensity > 0) by the pre- and post-reform periods. The top panel
is based on all absences, while the bottom panel is based on absences that
lasted between 4 and 28 days. Figure 2 suggests that although there was
some increase in sickness absences for firms with a low treatment intensity,
those that had a higher treatment intensity had fewer spells over most of the
treatment intensity distribution. We see a similar pattern for days; however,
firms that had a low treatment intensity had, on average, slightly more
days post-reform than pre-reform. (This plot is shown in Figure W.2 in the
Online Appendix.)
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Fig. 4. Leads and lags, by quartiles of treatment intensity: days
Notes: The figure plots the estimated treatment effects, β j , for days from estimating equation (2). Each dot is an
estimated treatment effect from a fixed-effects panel regression. The treatment indicator is 0, if the firm did not
receive refunds during the pre-reform period. The treatment indicator is 1 if the firms belongs to the qth-quartile
of the refund share distribution, excluding zeros. Each plot is based on a regression using the control group (N =
764,755 firm–month observations) and a quartile of the treatment intensity with values strictly greater than 0 (N =
221,962, 221,953, 221,905, and 221,922 firm–month observations). The reference month is September 2000 (i.e., the
last pre-reform month), which is indicated by the vertical dashed line.
For values greater than zero, we split the distribution of the refund share
into its quartiles. We compare firms from each quartile with the control
firms by re-estimating equation (2). The results from fixed-effects panel
regressions are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. These plots indicate that firms
that had a low refund share in the pre-reform period were not more likely
to experience an increase in sickness absences than firms in the control
group. In addition, we see that firms which that had a greater refund share
reacted more strongly to the reform than firms with lower values did. These
plots do not suggest that the common trend assumption was violated. We
re-estimate equation (2) but consider only absences of more than three and
less than 28 days. The pattern of leads and lags is similar to that presented
in Figure 1, and the diagrams are presented in Figure W.3 in the Online
Appendix.
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V. Main Results
In our main econometric specification, we model the effect of the reform on
sickness absences using the refund share to indicate the treatment intensity
of the insurance (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2004):
sickit = π0 + λ(refund share × period)it
+π1refund sharei + π2periodt + X
′
itδ + ai + νit, (3)
where the refund share is each firm’s pre-reform average of the monthly
refunds-to-premiums ratios. The main parameter of interest, λ, states the
marginal effect of the reform for given treatment intensities. The period
indicator has a value of zero for the pre-reform period (January 1998 to
September 2000), and a value of one for the post-reform period (October
2000 to September 2002). To account for differences between firms, we
use a set of firm characteristics, Xit , as control variables, which serve to
improve the precision of the estimated effects. We estimate equation (3)
using fixed-effects panel regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity,
ai , among firms. Standard errors are clustered on firms. (We also estimate
this equation using OLS, to demonstrate the robustness of the results.)
Table 2 tabulates the results from regressions where we estimate
the impact of the reform for the sickness outcomes. We use OLS
specifications, with and without additional covariates, and firm-level fixed-
effects regressions. The variables that control for firms’ characteristics are
the fraction of female workers, the fraction of workers younger than 25, the
fraction of workers older than 55, the fraction of apprentices, the fraction
of non-Austrian workers, workers’ mean wage, workers’ mean age, firms’
industry classification, and seasonal indicators.
Our preferred specifications are the fixed-effects panel regressions, but
there are only minor differences between the specifications. The results
indicate that the reform led to fewer sickness spells per worker, fewer
sickness days, and shorter spells. We also find that firms that were treated
more intensively had, on average, more and longer absences, and that there
were only minor differences between the pre- and post-reform periods. The
estimates indicate that a one-unit increase in the treatment intensity led to,
on average, 0.013 fewer spells per worker per month, 0.19 fewer absence
days per worker per month, and shorter durations of 0.14 days per spell.
These numbers imply elasticities of −12.2 percent for sickness spells, −17.5
percent for sickness days, and −17.1 percent for days per spell.11 We also
present the results from standardized regressions, which indicate that a one
standard deviation (SD) increase in the treatment intensity (0.766) led to
11Elasticities are calculated as λˆ ∗ X¯/y¯, where a bar indicates the mean of a variable.
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0.05 SD fewer sickness spells, 0.04 SD fewer sickness days, and 0.03 SD
shorter sickness spells.
For 2001, the first year after the reform, based on these estimates,
we calculate that the reform resulted in about 6.3 percent fewer sickness
absences.12 A similar calculation for absence days suggests that the
adjustment along the intensive margin resulted in about 8.6 percent fewer
absence days. Consequently, the average spell in 2001 was shorter by about
one day.
Alternative Treatment Variable
Blue-Collar Worker Share. We use the blue-collar worker share as an
alternative treatment variable to analyse the effects of the reform. The
share of blue-collar workers in a firm is perhaps more indicative of future
costs from sickness absences than past refunds are. We calculate a firm’s
mean share of blue-collar workers in the pre-reform period as a measure
of how strongly a firm could be affected by the reform. A comparison of
sickness absences along the distribution of this variable shows that both
spells and days are lower in the post-reform period (see Figures W.4 and
W.5 in the Online Appendix). Unlike the pattern shown in Figure 2, there is
no evidence that firms that had a greater share of blue-collar workers had
a greater reduction. The relative decrease in absences is fairly stable across
all percentiles of the blue-collar worker share distribution. The results from
these estimates are tabulated in Table 3.13
The results also indicate an effect of the reform on firms’ sickness
absences, and firms that had more blue-collar workers during the pre-reform
period had fewer and shorter sickness absences after the reform. However,
the estimated effect is smaller than in our previous estimates.
Blue-Collar Workers’ Wage Share. We also use the blue-collar workers’
wage share as an alternative measure for expected sickness costs. For
each firm, we calculate the monthly share of the wages paid to blue-collar
workers. Similar to the blue-collar worker share measure used above, we
estimate that the reform led to fewer and shorter absences; however, the
results do not differ from those obtained from using the blue-collar worker
share.
12We calculate the predicted number of sickness absences had there been no reform, using the
estimated parameters of the fixed-effects panel regression, and we compare this with the observed
number of sickness days.
13The estimated leads and lags of the reform are plotted in Figures W.6 and W.7 in the Online
Appendix, and patterns are similar to those in Figure 1.
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Table 4. Workforce compositions, by treatment status
Before After Difference DiD
Treated firms
Share blue-collar workers 0.684 0.671 −0.013 −0.031
Share workers 55+ 0.045 0.052 0.007 0.001
Hiring rate 0.119 0.119 0.000 −0.002
Separation rate 0.118 0.123 0.005 −0.002
Recall rate 0.120 0.121 0.001 −0.002
Blue-collar hiring rate 0.244 0.244 0.000 −0.006
Blue-collar separation rate 0.270 0.275 0.005 −0.003
Blue-collar recall rate 0.684 0.671 −0.013 −0.031
N 528,629 359,113
Control firms
Share blue-collar workers 0.247 0.265 0.018
Share workers 55+ 0.066 0.072 0.006
Hiring rate 0.123 0.125 0.002
Separation rate 0.119 0.126 0.007
Recall rate 0.128 0.131 0.003
Blue-collar hiring rate 0.086 0.092 0.006
Blue-collar separation rate 0.103 0.111 0.008
Blue-collar recall rate 0.247 0.265 0.018
N 442,464 322,291
Notes: 1,652,497 monthly observations of 33,892 firms. The treatment indicator is 1 if a firm received refunds in the
pre-reform period, whereas it is 0 if it did not receive any refunds. “Before” indicates the pre-reform period (January
1998 to September 2000) and “After” indicates the post-reform period (October 2000 to September 2002). The hiring
rate is the ratio of new workers to existing workers, for each month. The separation rate is the ratio of workers who are
not employed in the next month to the number of workers employed in current month. The recall rate is the ratio of
workers who are not employed in the next month, but who are re-employed within the following 12 months, to those
who are not employed in the next month. The corresponding blue-collar rates give the fraction of blue-collar workers
in the rate. “Difference” indicates the difference between the value in theAfter column and the Before column; “DiD”
indicates the difference-in-differences (i.e., the difference for treated firms − the difference for control firms).
Workforce Composition
Because the reform might have changed the relative cost of blue-collar and
white-collar workers, firms might have systematically different workforces
after the reform. In Table 4, we present several measures of workforce
changes, by treatment status and period. For the tabulation, we use the
binary treatment indicator, which is zero if the firm did not receive refunds,
and one if it did. We calculate the hiring rate (i.e., the ratio of new workers
to existing workers) for each month. Similarly, we calculate the separation
rate (i.e., the ratio of the number of workers who are not employed in
the next month to the number of workers employed in the current month).
C© 2018 The Authors. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Fo¨reningen
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Table 5. Estimated changes to firms’workforces
λ Standardized λ Mean (SD)
dependent variable
(1) Fraction of blue-collar workers −0.008 −0.020 0.483
(0.001) (0.002) (0.395)
(2) Fraction of workers 55+ −0.007 −0.017 0.057
(0.001) (0.002) (0.150)
Fraction of blue-collar workers:
(3) among new workers −0.006 −0.011 0.172
(0.001) (0.002) (0.336)
(4) among separations −0.005 −0.008 0.195
(0.002) (0.002) (0.358)
(5) among recalled workers −0.001 −0.001 0.450
(0.002) (0.002) (0.426)
(6) Fraction of new workers −0.001 −0.004 0.121
(0.001) (0.002) (0.221)
(7) Fraction of separations −0.0002 −0.001 0.121
(0.002) (0.001) (0.222)
(8) Fraction of recalled workers −0.002 −0.004 0.125
(0.001) (0.002) (0.222)
Notes: N = 1,652,497 monthly observations of 33,892 firms. The table presents coefficients, and their standard errors
(in parentheses), from separate estimations of equation (3) of the effect of the reform on workforce composition,
using fixed-effects panel regressions. Workforce composition is measured by: (1) the fraction of blue-collar workers;
(2) the fraction of older workers (workers older than 55); (3) the fraction of workers who started to work in the firm
in month t as a fraction of the number of workers in month t; (4) the number of workers who will stop working in
the firm in month t + 1 as a fraction of the number of workers in month t; (5) the fraction of workers who are not
with the firm in month t + 1 and who are re-employed within the following 12 months as a fraction of all workers
in month t; (6) the fraction of blue-collar workers among all new workers; (7) the fraction of blue-collar workers
among all separations; and (8) the fraction of blue-collar workers among recalled workers. Firm-level fixed-effects
panel regressions control for unobserved firm heterogeneity over time and for the time-varying covariates used in the
OLS specifications. Robust standard errors are clustered on firms.
We also calculate the recall rate (i.e., the fraction of workers who are not
employed in the next month, but are re-employed within the following 12
months) among all workers who are not employed in the next month. For
each of the three rates, we also calculate the fraction of blue-collar workers
in that rate. The results in Table 4 suggest that the reform had little impact
on the hiring or separation behaviour of firms, except for the recall of blue-
collar workers in treated firms, which decreased by about three percentage
points.
In Table 5, we tabulate the estimation results to detail the effect
of the reform on workforce composition. We use the same econometric
specifications as for our main results but we focus on whether firms changed
the hiring and workforce selection processes or not. In the first step, we
C© 2018 The Authors. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Fo¨reningen
fo¨r utgivande av the SJE/The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
20 Costs of sickness absences
regress firms’ share of blue-collar workers on the treatment intensity, and
other explanatory variables, to estimate if the reform led to differential
changes in firms’ workforce compositions. In the next step, we calculate the
share of blue-collar workers among newly hired workers and among those
who left the firm. We then regress these rates on the treatment intensity to
analyse whether the (perceived) change in relative prices for both blue- and
white-collar workers led firms to adapt their hiring.
We estimate that the reform caused firms that were treated more
intensively to lower the fraction of blue-collar workers; however, the
estimated effect is small. A one-unit increase in treatment intensity is
estimated to decrease the fraction of blue-collar workers in the firm by
0.8 percentage points (pre-reform mean of 0.485). Substitution between
blue- and white-collar workers is costly in the short term because workers
are classified as blue- or white-collar workers depending on the tasks they
perform, and any significant substitution would thus require restructuring
the production process. We examine the possible channel of such an
adjustment by estimating the fraction of blue-collar worker among new
hires, workers who leave the firm, and among recalls. We estimate that the
fraction of blue-collar workers among new hires declined. The share of blue-
collar workers among the workers who leave the firm also declined (i.e.,
blue-collar worker retention increased). However, both effects are relatively
small.
Older workers are more often sick than younger workers; for
example, in 2000, Austrian workers aged 55–64 had more than twice
the average number of sickness days (Hauptverband der o¨sterreichischen
Sozialversicherungstra¨ger, 2001). Firms could have reacted to the reform
by changing the age structure of their workforce. We estimate that firms
employed fewer older workers post-reform, although the magnitude of this
change was small.
In addition, we calculate a hiring rate and a separation rate to see if
the reform led firms to change their hiring or separation patterns. The
estimated results do not suggest that firms changed their behaviour along
these dimensions. Similarly, we do not find evidence for a change in how
firms use recalls (i.e., lay off workers who are rehired within the next 12
months).14
Sample Restrictions
Our estimates indicate that the abolition of the insurance significantly
reduced sickness absences. We provide a series of robustness checks to
14Because our data are right-censored, we use different cut-offs for the periods within which a
worker is recalled (3, 6, and 12 months). The results do not differ.
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Fig. 5. Robustness: different definitions
Notes: Bars present the estimated effects of abolishing the refund, λ, and the whiskers show the 95 percent confidence
intervals from estimations of equation (3) using fixed-effects panel regressions. The first bars are the estimated
effects as tabulated in Table 2. The second bars are from estimations where we exclude all firms in seasonal sectors.
The third bars give the estimated effects limiting the observations to a balanced panel. The fourth bars are from
estimations where the sickness variables are based on sickness absences of 4–28 days only. The estimations that
are the basis for the fourth bars use only spells where the firms’ liability to pay continued wages ended during the
spell.
gauge the reliability of these results. We plot the estimated coefficients,
and their confidence intervals, from firm-specific fixed-effects panel
regressions in Figure 5. The first bars plot the estimated λ, with standard
errors in parentheses, from the panel regressions, which are tabulated in
Table 2.
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Seasonal Sectors. Austria has a considerable seasonal sector, particularly
in the tourism and in the building sectors (Del Bono and Weber, 2008).
Firms that operate seasonally might monitor their workers differently or
provide their workers with different incentives than firms that operate
throughout the year. While we control for a firm’s sector using indicator
variables, or firm-fixed effects, in our main specifications, we re-estimate
the effect of the reform on a reduced sample to investigate the robustness
of the results. Eliminating firms that operate in the construction and tourism
sectors from our sample does not result in a different estimate of the
treatment effect, which can be seen from the second bars in Figure 5.
Balanced Panel. Our main estimating sample is an unbalanced panel and
consists of all firms with employees in any month during January 1998 to
September 2002. This sample could systematically bias the results, if, for
example, the insurance allowed firms with a sicker workforce to remain
in the market longer than without an insurance. Therefore, we restrict our
sample to a balanced panel of those firms that are observed in each of the
57 months of our observation period. (Note that this creates a survival bias
as exiting firms are no longer in the sample.) These coefficients are plotted
as the third bar in Figure 5. There are only small differences between these
estimates and our main results.
Short Spells. All employees must visit a medical doctor if their sickness
absence is longer than three days. Firms can request that employees
visit doctors even for shorter sickness absences. Because not all firms
compel their workers in the same way, we construct alternative measures
of sicknesses to limit any measurement error arising from this. We use
bounded versions of our main sickness indicator that are based on sickness
absences of a duration of 4–28 days. The estimated treatment effect is
plotted as the fourth bar in Figure 5. The estimates are virtually identical
and do not change our interpretation of the causal effects of the reform.
Very Long Spells. If a worker is sick for more than his or her legal
entitlement to continued wage payments, the worker receives sick pay from
the social security. It is likely that firms and employees cannot influence
very long sickness absences as easily as shorter sickness absences. We
estimate the effect of the reform on both the number and the days of very
long sickness absences. We plot the estimated coefficients as the fifth bar
in Figure 5. We estimate that the reform lowered the number of very long
sickness spells, but it had virtually no effect on the number of days of such
very long spells.
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White-Collar Workers. We also estimate sickness absences separately for
blue- and white-collar workers. The estimated λ (and standard error) for the
sickness spells of white-collar workers is 0.0001 (0.0002) and for sickness
days −0.010 (0.007). The estimates are available in Table W.1 in the Online
Appendix. These estimates indicate that the reduction in sickness absences
was caused by a reduction of blue-collar workers’ absences. We do not
find evidence for spillover effects of the reform on white-collar workers’
absences.
VI. Overall Effect of the Reform
The reform lowered the number of absence days of blue-collar workers and
thus led to savings in terms of continued wage payments. Based on the
panel fixed-effect estimates, we estimate that firms would have had about
8.58 percent fewer absence days in 2001. Based on blue-collar workers’
average wages, this reduction implies a saving of about 8.25 percent in
continued wage payments. Alternatively, in 2001, each firm in our sample
saved, on average, about 1,931 euros, almost 20 percent more than one
monthly average wage (1,633 euros).
However, if we consider the net cost effects of the reform on firms, we
need to take into account that in a counterfactual scenario, without abolition
of the insurance scheme, firms would have paid insurance premiums but
would have received wage payment refunds. Prior to the reform, a large
share of the firms in our sample received more refunds than they paid
premiums. For example, in 1999, the year prior to that of the reform, about
37.3 percent of the firms in our sample received more in refunds than
they paid in premiums.15 For this reason and in spite of the substantial
reduction in sickness days, for many firms the direct net costs of sickness
absences were greater in 2001 than they would have been if the insurance
scheme were still in place. According to our estimates, 77.9 percent firms
had higher costs than under the counterfactual scenario. For them, absence
costs in 2001 were, on average, about 1,066 euros greater than with
insurance.
Ideally, we would want to compare the total costs for sickness absence
borne by firms and social security in the aftermath of the reform with
the counterfactual costs of all stakeholders, under the assumption that
the insurance scheme was still in place. We do not possess sufficient
15This does not necessarily imply that the insurance performed negatively overall. A negative
financial performance in one period could have been counterbalanced by a positive performance
in another period. We only observe sicknesses in one region, and in other regions the pattern
could have been reversed, resulting in an overall positive financial performance. Unfortunately,
we do not have any information on the insurance’s financial performance.
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information to carry out this comparison, mainly because we do not
know much about the financial performance of the insurance fund. The
quantification of potential savings for public funds depends at least partially
on whether the reform reduced the sick pay days paid by the social
insurance agency. Our results indicate that, in the short term, the reform
did not affect long-term sickness absences, and therefore the number of
absence days covered by sick pay.16 This is consistent with the expectation
that, at least in the short to medium term, the reform did not result in
changes that affected the causes for long absence spells (i.e., severe illnesses
and accidents); in the long term, changes in prevention could potentially
reduce long absences. We conclude that the reform had a sizeable effect on
absences and reduced the overall expenditure for continued wage payment,
but that it did not directly affect the monetary sickness absence costs borne
by social insurance.
VII. Conclusion and Discussion
We analysed sickness absences in an institutional setting where a reform
led to the abolition of an insurance mechanism that refunded firms for the
wages they paid their sick blue-collar workers. Using administrative data
and the variation in firms’ reliance on the insurance before the reform, we
found robust evidence for a reduction in firm-level absenteeism in reaction
to an exogenous change in sickness costs.
Consistent with our expectations, we found that sickness absences
decreased more in firms that had benefited most from the insurance
mechanism (i.e., those that potentially faced the greatest increase in costs).
According to our estimates, the reform led, on average, to fewer and shorter
sickness absences. Absences started to fall immediately after the policy
change, indicating that the reform had an immediate impact. The drop in
sickness absences was confined to blue-collar workers’ absences and we
did not detect any effect on white-collar workers’ absences. This reaction
to the reform lowered continued wage payments for firms.
We interpret our results as a clear finding that sickness absences react
to changes in firms’ sickness costs. Different transmission mechanisms
might explain this result. Firms might have reacted to the reform by
investing in health promotion (Aldana and Pronk, 2001) or by enforcing
stricter monitoring (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004). They might also have
changed their hiring policies to select a healthier workforce, but it is also
16If the reform resulted in more presenteeism (e.g., if workers fear losing their job due to greater
sickness costs for firms), then this could result in more severe sickness absences in the medium
term.
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possible that changes in workers’ behaviour were the source of the observed
reduction in absences. Given that, in Austria, workers are not protected
from dismissal during sickness absences, it is possible that part of the
reduction was due to workers who avoided sickness absences after the
reform (presenteeism). However, it is also possible that absences before
the reform were inflated and the reduction is due to a correction of firms’
moral hazard.
While our data do not allow us to investigate all potential transmission
mechanisms, the available information does provide partial evidence. Our
analyses show that in the two years after the reform, firms did not change
their hiring and separation rates, and did not make increased use of
temporary lay-offs. We did find a small reduction in the workforce share
of blue-collar workers because of the reform. This suggests that changes
in workforce composition and stricter selection processes played at most
a limited role. Because we observe that the effects emerged immediately
after the reform, it is unlikely that the reduction in sickness absence can
be explained by increased prevention. Overall, our findings suggest that
other factors are more likely the reason for the reaction to the reform.
These include stricter monitoring of absences and behavioural responses by
employees.
Our findings are of interest for the design of social insurance policies
and sick pay systems. Sick pay regulation is a central component of
modern welfare states.17 Our results strengthen the argument that calls on
firms to carry a portion of the costs of sick pay. Clearly, an insurance
for costs related to sickness absences might have negative effects on
absenteeism and (some) firms have little incentive to monitor or prevent
absenteeism.
However, this does not imply that a large shift of the burden to firms
necessarily increases the overall welfare. An increase in costs borne by
firms (e.g., through experience-rated sick pay schemes) could lead firms to
place more weight on workers’ health status during their hiring procedure.
This might create unintended difficulties for workers who suffer from poor
health and their integration in the labour market. Although we do not find
such responses in the short term, evidence for the Netherlands, for instance,
where the introduction of the Gatekeeper protocol extended firms’ liability
for continued wage payments of sick workers to two years, suggests a
stronger sorting of workers with poor health into flexible and non-permanent
employment contracts (Koning and Lindeboom, 2015).
17In 1883, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck laid the foundation of the modern welfare
state with sickness insurance legislation that included paid sickness absences for workers in the
case of illness for a period of 13 weeks.
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Appendix: Background and Descriptive Statistics
Table A1. Legal differences between blue- and white-collar workers
2000 (before reform) 2001 (after reform)
Blue-collar White-collar Blue-collar White-collar
Maximum duration of wage payments in case of sickness (weeks)
At tenure:
< 5 years 4 6 6 6
5–15 years 6 8 8 8
15–25 years 8 10 10 10
≥ 25 years 10 12 12 12
Within calendar year Fixed Unlimited Fixed Unlimited
Health insurance contributions
Employers 3.95 3.40 3.65 3.40
Workers 3.95 3.50 3.95 3.50
Minimum period of notice One day Six weeks One day Six weeks
Notes: Health insurance contributions are expressed as percentage of gross wage (salary). Period of notice: the
minimum period can be extended by collective bargaining. Maximum period of wage payment within a calendar year:
for blue-collar workers this is fixed, regardless of how many times a worker falls ill; white-collar workers can claim
longer periods of wage payments within a calendar year if they fall ill repeatedly.
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Table A2. Summary statistics
All Treatment indicator
Control Treated
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Days 0.679 2.440 0.422 3.080 0.899 2.440
Days, bounded 0.484 1.506 0.281 1.453 0.660 1.527
Spells 0.064 0.152 0.038 0.146 0.086 0.153
Spells, bounded 0.053 0.138 0.030 0.132 0.072 0.141
Refunds 292.799 3,470.664 0 0 544.899 4,720.689
Premiums 489.204 3,413.106 480.930 3,370.715 496.333 3,449.193
Refund share 0.600 0.765 0 0 1.117 0.715
Small firm in pre-reform 0.744 0.416 0.769 0.399 0.722 0.430
Fraction
apprentices 0.069 0.148 0.040 0.120 0.095 0.164
blue-collar workers 0.483 0.395 0.255 0.375 0.679 0.293
foreigners 0.075 0.168 0.070 0.167 0.079 0.169
women 0.490 0.371 0.511 0.390 0.472 0.354
workers 18–24 0.185 0.233 0.142 0.216 0.221 0.240
workers 55+ 0.058 0.150 0.069 0.180 0.048 0.117
Average workers’ age 35.995 7.651 37.313 8.037 34.859 7.109
Average workers’ wage 53.037 24.388 58.591 28.618 48.251 18.764
N 1,652,497 764,755 887,742
Notes: A firm is considered treated (untreated) if it received (did not receive) any refunds for its blue-collar workers’
sickness absences during the pre-reform period, January 1998 to September 2000. “Days, bounded” and “Spells,
bounded” refer to sickness days per worker and spells per worker in month t based on sickness absences of durations
of 4–28 days only.A firm is considered small if its monthly wage sum is less than 180 times the maximum daily social
security contribution. Wages are deflated to 2000 using the Harmonized Consumer Prize Index (Statistik Austria,
2013).
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Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
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